Case Note: Labor Law - Collective Bargaining - Job Security is a Proper Subject of Negotiations Between a Public Employer and Public Employee Organization Under the Taylor Law by Keenan, Joan W.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 5 | Number 3 Article 11
1977
Case Note: Labor Law - Collective Bargaining - Job
Security is a Proper Subject of Negotiations
Between a Public Employer and Public Employee
Organization Under the Taylor Law
Joan W. Keenan
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Government Contracts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joan W. Keenan, Case Note: Labor Law - Collective Bargaining - Job Security is a Proper Subject of Negotiations Between a Public Employer
and Public Employee Organization Under the Taylor Law, 5 Fordham Urb. L.J. 573 (1977).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol5/iss3/11
CASE NOTES
LABOR LAW - Collective Bargaining - Job Security is a Pro-
per Subject of Negotiations Between a Public Employer and
Public Employee Organization Under the Taylor Law. Board of
Education v. Yonkers Federation of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353
N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976).
In 1975 the city of Yonkers was plagued by a severe financial
emergency.' As part of an effort to balance its budget, plaintiff
Yonkers City Board of Education unilaterally terminated the serv-
ices of a number of'teachers. Defendant Yonkers Federation of
Teachers demanded arbitration on this issue under the terms of a
job security clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement
between the Board and the Federation.3 Plaintiff then brought a
proceeding for a stay of arbitration.4
Plaintiff Board of Education contended that job security is an
improper subject for a collective bargaining agreement.5 It also
argued that, even if job security were a proper subject, considera-
tions of public policy, generated by the deplorable financial condi-
tions of the city, would have permitted the abolition of jobs in this
instance and the denial of the arbitration agreement! The Board
pointed to the New York State Financial Emergency Act7 for the
1. Section 2-a of the New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of Yonkers
states that, "The legislature hereby finds and declares that a state of financial emergency
exists within the city of Yonkers." 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 871, § 2-a.
2. Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 271, 353 N.E.2d 569, 570,
386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 658 (1976).
3. Id. The collective bargaining agreement between the teachers union and the board of
education provided that, "During the life of this contract no person in this bargaining unit
shall be terminated due to budgetary reasons or abolition of programs but only for unsatisfac-
tory job performance .... " The agreement also contained broad grievance and arbitration
clauses. Id. at 272, 353 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
4. Id. at 271, 353 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658. Plaintiff Board of Education brought
this proceeding for a stay of arbitration under section 7503 of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules which states in part: "[A] party who has not participated in the arbitration
and who has not made or been served with an application to compel arbitration, may apply
to stay arbitration on the ground that a valid agreement was not made or has not been
complied with. ... N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7503(b) (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
5. 40 N.Y.2d at 272, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
6. Id. at 275, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
7. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 871.
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City of Yonkers as evincing a legislative determination which fa-
vored the abolition of jobs.'
Conversely, defendant teachers' union declared that "neither
statute nor controlling decisional law, nor public policy, prohibited
the board from voluntarily negotiating, before the onset of the legis-
latively declared emergency, about job security."9 Thus, the union
maintained that the agreement with respect to job security was
valid when made, and should be honored even though the city was
encountering fiscal difficulties.
The supreme court, Westchester County, held the job security
clause void as violative of public policy and granted a stay of arbi-
tration."° The appellate division affirmed." The court of appeals
reversed the lower court rulings and enforced the collective bargain-
ing agreement by directing the parties to proceed to arbitration
under its terms. 2 It held that job security is a proper subject for
bargaining between public employers and public employees because
no statute, controlling decisional law, nor restrictive public policy
prohibits negotiating about the subject. 3 The court stated that this
particular job security clause merited enforcement since it was of
relatively brief duration (three years), was not negotiated in a time
of financial emergency, and was explicit in excluding budgetary
reasons as a valid excuse for firing teachers. 4 Chief Judge Breitel
also declared that the financial crisis facing Yonkers was not a suffi-
ciently crucial public policy consideration to warrant the condoning
of a breach of the job security clause. i 5
Almost a decade has elapsed since Governor Rockefeller signed
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act" in 1967,1 lauding it
as a "milestone in employer-employee relationships in the state'"'
8. 40 N.Y.2d at 275, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
9. Id. at 272-73, 353 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658-59.
10. Id. at 271, 353 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
11. 51 App. Div. 2d 568, 379 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d
569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976).
12. 40 N.Y.2d at 276, 353 N.E.2d at 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
13. Id. at 271-72, 353 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
14. Id. at 275-76, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61.
15. Id. at 276, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
16. N.Y. CIv. SEEv. LAw art. 14 (McKinney 1973), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
17. This law was passed by the Legislature and signed by the Governor on April 21, 1967.
Public Employees Fair Employment Act, 1967 N.Y. Laws ch. 392.
18. N.Y. Times, April 22, 1967, at 19, col. 3.
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for its novel provision of "basic rights for public employees that
have been previously unrecognized in the law."' 9 The aim of the
framers of the statute, popularly known as the Taylor Law, was to
replace the unworkable harsh strike penalties of the Condon-Wadlin
Act 0 with legislation that not only would protect the public against
the impairment of vital public services by illegal strikes, but would
also grant the public employee rights of representation and collec-
tive bargaining.2 However, questions continue to arise over the
scope of these rights.2
The Taylor Law imposes an obligation to negotiate only as to
subjects deemed "terms and conditions of employment."2" These
are the mandatory subjects of negotiations between a public em-
ployer and employee.24 Although the statute defines "terms and
conditions of employment" as "salaries, wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment,"" the definition is a general
one which does not sufficiently specify the mandatory subjects of
negotiations."
19. Letter from Governor Rockefeller on the Enactment of the Public Employees Fair
Employment Act of 1967 (April 21, 1967) published in 1967 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1527 (McKinney
1967).
20. 1958 N.Y. Laws ch. 790, § 108 (repealed 1967).
21. Governor's Committee on Public Employment Relations' Final Report, State of New
York 9 (March 31, 1966); section 203 of the Taylor Law provides that: "Public employees shall
have the right to be represented by employee organizations to negotiate collectively with their
public employers in the determination of their terms and conditions of employment, and the
administration of grievances arising thereunder." N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 203 (McKinney
1973).
22. Although the Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations' Final Report
suggests that "[tihere be clarification by statute as to which subjects are open to negotiation
in whole or in part, which require legislative approval of modifications agreed upon by the
parties, and which are for determination solely by the legislative body," the Legislature did
not opt to include any extensive listing of negotiable and nonnegotiable subjects in the terms
of the Taylor Law. GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS' FINAL REP., STATE OF
NEW YORK 45-46 (March 31, 1966).
23. Under the terms of the statute the "terms and conditions of employment" are the only
subjects about which an employer is required to negotiate. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 203, 204(2)
(McKinney 1973).
24. An employer's failure to negotiate with respect to the "terms and conditions of em-
ployment" is deemed as "improper employer practice" which is subject to the sanction of the
Public Employment Relations Board [hereinafter cited as PERBI issuing an order to negoti-
ate in good faith. Id. §§ 209-a(1)(d), 205(5)(d).
25. Id. § 201(4) (McKinney 1973), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
26. The Nevada Local Government Employee-Management Relations Act is an example
of a public employment statute that, unlike New York's Taylor Law, is fairly definite as to
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The task of determining the extent of these collective bargaining
rights under the Taylor Law passed to the Public Employment Re-
lations Board (PERB) 7 and the courts."8 Following the rationale
that exists in the private sector,2" they have characterized collective
bargaining subjects as: (1) issues warranting mandatory negotia-
what matters shall be deemed mandatory or non-mandatory subjects of negotiations. The law
states that:
The scope of mandatory bargaining is limited to:
(a) Salary or wage rates or other forms of direct monetary compensation. (b) Sick
leave. (c) Vacation leave. (d) Holidays. (e) Other paid or nonpaid leaves of ab-
sence. (f) Insurance benefits. (g) Total hours of work required of an employee on
each work day or work week. (h) Total number of days' work required of an employee
in a work year. (i) Discharge and disciplinary procedures. (j) Recognition clause.
(k) The method used to classify employees in the bargaining unit. (1) Deduction of
dues for the recognized employee organization. (m) Protection of employees in the
bargaining unit from discrimination because of participation in recognized employee
organizations consistent with the provisions of this chapter. (n) No-strike provisions
consistent with the provisions of this chapter. (o) Grievance and arbitration proce-
dures for resolution of disputes relating to interpretation or application of collective
bargaining agreements. (p) General savings clauses. (q) Duration of collective bar-
gaining agreements. (r) Safety. (s) Teacher preparation time. (t) Procedures for
reduction in work force.
Those subject matters which are not within the scope of mandatory bargaining and
which are reserved to the local government employer without negotiation include:
(a) The right to hire, direct, assign or transfer an employee, but excluding the right
to assign or transfer an employee as a form of discipline. (b) The right to reduce in
force or lay off any employee because of lack of work or lack of funds, subject to
paragraph (t) of subsection 2. (c) The right to determine: (1) Appropriate staffing
levels and work performance standards, except for safety considerations; (2) The
content of the workday, including without limitation workload factors, except for
safety considerations; (3) The quality and quantity of services to be offered to the
public; and (4) The means and methods of offering those services.
NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 288.150(2)-(3) (1973).
27. N.Y. Cirv. SERV. LAw § 205(1) (McKinney 1973). Section 205(1) of the Taylor Law
created the Public Employment Relations Board to "assist in resolving disputes between
public employees and public employers." Id. § 200(d). Section 205 also authorizes PERB to
conduct studies of those subjects which are negotiable in whole or in part or nonnegotiable
under the Taylor Law. Id. §§ 205(5)(g)(iii), 205(5)(g)(v). PERB's decisions in resolving dis-
putes over the negotiability of certain subjects should be conclusive if reasonable, since the
New York Court of Appeals held that PERB's decisions should be accepted unless they are
clearly unreasonable. West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 50-51, 315
N.E.2d 775, 777, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722-23 (1974). See City of Schenectady v. Helsby, 57 Misc.
2d 91, 292 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
28. Section 213 of the Taylor Law provides that a party may seek judicial review by the
courts of an order by PERB. Parties may also ask the courts to enforce PERB's decisions.
N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 213 (McKinney 1973).
29. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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tions;10 (2) problems that may be properly bargained about on a
voluntary basis;" or (3) matters which may not be negotiated, even
on a permissive basis.2
In City School District v. New Rochelle Federation of Teachers,"13
PERB characterized curtailment of services and job eliminations as
non-mandatory subjects of negotiations under the Taylor Law2 It
rejected the New Rochelle Federation of Teachers' contention that
a public employer must negotiate with the recognized employee
organization concerning a decision to reduce its work force.3" While
PERB conceded that the decision to reduce the work force would
affect conditions of employment, the Board stated: "[Ilt does not
follow that every decision of a public employer which may affect job
security is a mandatory subject of negotiations."3 PERB pointed
out the distinction between the responsibility of the public and
private employer, noting that public employers "owe a very special
obligation to the public not owed by private employers."37 It rea-
soned that a "public employer exists to provide certain services to
its constituents, be it police protection, sanitation or . . education
[and that] [o]f necessity, the public employer, acting through its
executive or legislative body, must determine the manner and
means by which such services are to be rendered and the extent
30. E.g., Albany PPFA, 7 P.E.R.B. 3142 (1974) (death benefits, exclusively of representa-
tion, establishment of labor-management and joint safety committees, parity, retirement and
seniority rights are mandatory subjects of negotiation between the government and its fire-
fighters).
31. E.g., New York City School Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 39 N.Y.2d 111, 347 N.E.2d
568, 383 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1976) (demand that each student have a specific number of contact
periods is a non-mandatory subject of negotiation, but hours of instruction for students may
be negotiated on a permissive basis); Board of Educ. v. Areman, 52 App. Div. 2d 573, 382
N.Y.S.2d 515 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.) (inspection of employee personnel files by an employer
is a non-mandatory subject of negotiations, but an employer may limit his right to inspect
personnel files).
32. E.g., Farrigan v. Helsby, 68 Misc. 2d 952 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aff g 3 P.E.R.B. 3632 (1970)
(agency shop).
33. 4 P.E.R.B. 3704 (1971).
34. Id. at 3706. The case arose after the superintendent of schools, for reasons of economic
and administrative efficiency, recommended and approved budget cuts that would result in
the elimination of departments in the school system and the termination of about 140 posi-
tions. Id. at 3705.
35. Id. at 3705.
36. Id. at 3706.
37. Id. at 3706-07.
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thereof . .. ."3 The Board maintained that a budget cut with con-
comitant job eliminations is primarily a managerial decision which
the public employer should have the power to make."
PERB's precise ruling in New Rochelle was that this curtailment
of services was not a subject about which an employer could be
compelled to negotiate." Concomitantly, PERB added that its
decision would not prevent an employee organization from "seeking
negotiations concerning such decisions on a permissive basis."'"
This ruling gave the public employer the option of voluntarily nego-
tiating with an employee union on job elimination. Nevertheless, a
number of subsequent decisions stripped the resultant collective
bargaining agreements of their validity and enforceability.
Two years after PERB decided New Rochelle, the supreme court,
Putnam County, declared that an agreement prohibiting job aboli-
tion would not be legally enforceable.42 In Carmel Central School
District v. Carmel Teachers Association43 the court concluded that
the creation and abolition of positions in a school district were board
of education functions which could not be delegated." It also rea-
38. Id. at 3706.
39. Id. The framers of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law incorporated this
rationale into the language of their law. While subdivision (a) of section 1173-4.3 (dealing with
the scope of collective bargaining) maintains that it is the public employer's duty to bargain
about wages, hours and working conditions, subdivision (b) states that:
It is the right of the city, or any other public employer. . . to determine the standards
of services to be offered by its agencies; . . . relieve its employees from duty because
of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; . . . determine the methods, means and
personnel by which government operations are to be conducted; . . . take all necessary
actions to carry out its mission in emergencies; and exercise complete control and
discretion over its organization and the technology of performing its work. Decisions
of the city or any other public employer on those matters are not within the scope of
collective bargaining ....
Collective Bargaining Law, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, § 1173-4.3(b) (1975).
40. 4 P.E.R.B. at 3706 (1971).
41. Id. at 3707. The Board also held that, although the employer cannot be compelled to
negotiate about a decision to terminate positions, the "impact" of such a decision on the
"terms and conditions of employment" would be a mandatory subject of negotiations. Id.
Some examples of such mandatory subjects would be severance pay, continued medical and
other fringe benefits, order of layoff and workload of remaining employees. Somers Faculty
Ass'n, 9 P.E.R.B. 3022, 3024-25 (1976); City of White Plains, 5 P.E.R.B. 3013, 3014 (1972).
42. Carmel Cent. School Dist. v. Carmel Teachers Ass'n, 76 Misc. 2d 63, 67, 348 N.Y.S.2d
665, 669-70 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
43. 76 Misc. 2d 63, 348 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
44. Id. at 66-67, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
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soned that the creation and abolition of positions were not terms
and conditions of employment, and that boards of education could
not negotiate and contract withrespect to them, even on a voluntary
basis.15 No mention was made of PERB's New Rochelle opinion."
Subsequently, in Lippman v. Delaney,47 the appellate division
also failed to follow .the rationale of the New Rochelle opinion. In-
stead, Justice Samuel Rabin refused to enforce a job security clause
which was voluntarily negotiated by the county of Westchester with
the Westchester County Civil Service Employees Association. 8 The
court correctly perceived that PERB classified a reduction in work
force for budgetary reasons as a non-mandatory subject of negotia-
tions under the Taylor Law, 9 but then erroneously stated that two
PERB decisions" also declared that this was not a proper subject
for a collective bargaining agreement between a public employer
45. Id., 348 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70.
46. In an attempt to buttress his affirmation, Justice John P. Donohoe cited only one
authority and mistakenly claimed that the court of appeals in Board of Education v. Asso-
ciated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972), held
that a board of education had no authority to negotiate a matter that was not considered a
"term and condition of employment." Carmel Cent. School Dist. v. Carmel Teachers Ass'n,
76 Misc. 2d at 66, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 669. However, rather than restricting the ability of an
employer to negotiate with an employee organization about declared non-mandatory sub-
jects, the Huntington court directed its attention to the broad range of subjects that could
be classified as mandatory subjects of negotiation. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers of
Huntington, 30 N.Y.2d at 129, 282 N.E.2d. at 113, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 23. In the opinion, Chief
Judge Fuld emphasized that the Taylor Law's purpose of encouraging harmonious relations
in public employment could best be effectuated through increased negotiation between public
employers and their employee organizations. He stated that their ability to negotiate was only
limited by direct statutory prohibitions, Id. at 127-29, 282 N.E.2d at 111-13, 331 N.Y.S.2d at
21-23.
47. 48 App. Div. 2d 913, 370 N.Y.S.2d 128 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.).
48. Id. at 914, 370 N.Y.S,2d at 130-31. The action was brought by the Civil Service
Employees Association and Walter Lippmann, whose position as a Deputy Sheriff was termi-
nated by the Westchester County Board of Legislators because of a reorganization of depart-
ments for budgetary reasons. Id. at 913-14, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30. The relief Lippmann
sought was either reinstatement or reclassification. He relied on a clause in his contract with
the County of Westchester which stated that, "In any reorganization of the Sheriff's Depart-
ment, the County administration has no intention of depriving any permanent employee who
is now on the payroll of a job." Id. at 915, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 131. The contract provided that,
in the event of reorganization, either the whole unit would be transferred to the jurisdiction
of another agency, or if an employee was not transferred with his unit, he would be offered
another equivalent position in city service. Id.
49. Id. at 914, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
50. Yorktown Faculty Ass'n, 7 P.E.R.B. 4509 (1974); City of White Plains, 5 P.E.R.B.
3013 (1972).
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and employee organization.'
Shortly after the appellate division rendered its decision in
Lippmann, the court of appeals adopted the reasoning of the New
Rochelle opinion in Susquehanna Valley Central School District v.
Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Association."2 The case arose when
budget limitations of the Susquehanna school district necessitated
staff reductions. 3 The Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Association
demanded reinstatement of the abolished positions." It cited a
collective bargaining agreement which guaranteed the permanency
of these positions by stabilizing staff size.5 The court of appeals
upheld the ability of the board of education to negotiate voluntarily
about the stability of staff size.5 It concluded that a public em-
ployer has authority to negotiate voluntarily with his public em-
ployees about non-mandatory subjects under the Taylor Law if no
statute, controlling decisional law, or considerations of public policy
prohibited such action. 7 The court noted that none of these factors
51. 48 App. Div. 2d at 914, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 130-31. Although both cases to which Justice
Samuel Rabin refers did state that an employer could not be "compelled" to negotiate about
job reductions or job security, they were silent on the point of the permissibility of negotiating
about these issues. However, since the employee associations in both cases were demanding
negotiation about job security rather than seeking judgment on the validity of job security
clauses after they were already voluntarily negotiated, it is evident that the facts of these
cases did not warrant a discussion of permissive negotiations of non-mandatory subjects.
Thus, it seems certain that PERB's silence on this subject in these cases was in no way
indicating a rejection of the very principle it espoused in New Rochelle. Rather, the Board
merely chose not to discuss a point that was unnecessary for resolution of the facts presented.
Yorktown Faculty Ass'n, 7 P.E.R.B. 4509 (1974); City of White Plains, 5 P.E.R.B. 3013
(1972).
In his dissenting opinion in Lippmann, Justice James D. Hopkins reiterated the notion
promulgated in New Rochelle. He concluded that it is not "an impermissable surrender of
municipal power" to include job permanency within the negotiated terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. The judge stressed the holding of the court of appeals in Syacuse
Teachers Association v. Board of Education, 35 N.Y.2d 743, 320 N.E.2d 646, 361 N.Y.S.2d
912 (1974), that the collective bargaining rights afforded under the Taylor Law are broad in
scope and limited only by prohibitions in statute or decisional law. 48 App. Div. 2d at 915-
16, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 131-32.
52. 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975).
53. Id. at 616, 339 N.E.2d at 133, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 37 N.Y.2d at 617-18, 339 N.E.2d at 133-34, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 429-30.
57. Id. The court extended the rule advanced in Syracuse by adding restrictive public
policy considerations as another limitation on the public employer's freedom to contract with
the public employee about non-mandatory subjects. See note 51 supra.
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were present in this case.58 It therefore held that the collective bar-
gaining agreement should be enforced and the parties should pro-
ceed to arbitration under its terms. 59
The instant case6 reached the second department just five
months after the court of appeals decision in Susquehanna. Never-
theless, the appellate division, in three decisions on the same day,6'
flatly rejected Susquehanna.
In Schwab v. Bowen,"2 the second department refused to enforce
a collective bargaining agreement that guaranteed public employees
job security for a period of three years. 3 The court reverted to the
narrow view propounded by the supreme court in Carmel and the
appellate division in Lippmann that the public employer possesses
the power to create and abolish positions in good faith, that such
good faith creation and abolition are non-mandatory subjects of
negotiation between an employer and an employee, and that any
collective bargaining agreement that attempts to deal with this non-
mandatory subject and to restrict the employer's ability to termi-
nate positions wouldnot be upheld. 4
Schwab is an extreme holding. In rejecting the non-mandatory -
but - permissive stance of New Rochelle and Susquehanna, Presid-
ing Justice Frank A. Gulotta contended that the subject of job elim-
ination cannot be negotiated, even on a voluntary basis, because it
is not a term or condition of employment. 5
However, Justice Gulotta did qualify his rejection of
Susquehanna. He stated that "even were we to accept the concept
that a public employer may voluntarily choose to bargain collec-
tively as to a non-mandatory subject of negotiation [the concept
advanced by PERB in New Rochelle and adopted by the court of
appeals in Susquehanna], the public interest or welfare in this case
58. 37 N.Y.2d at 617-18, 339 N.E.2d at 134, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 429.
59. Id.
60. Board of Educ. v. Yonkers Fed'n of Teachers, 51 App. Div. 2d 568, 379 N.Y.S.2d 109
(2d Dep't), rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976).
61. Id.; Schwab v. Bowen, 51 App. Div. 2d 574, 379 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dep't 1976); Yonkers
School Crossing Guard Union v. City of Yonkers, 51 App. Div. 2d 594, 379 N.Y.S.2d 113 (2d
Dep't), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 964, 354 N.E.2d 846, 387 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1976).
62. 51 App. Div. 2d 574, 379 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dep't 1976).
63. Id. at 574-75, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
64. Id. at 575, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 112. See notes 43-51 supra and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 575, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
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demands that the public employers' job abolition power remain
unfettered."" The judge maintained that the fiscal crisis facing the
city of Long Beach was a public policy consideration which would
supercede that city's duty to honor the contractual rights afforded
to its public employees by the job security clause. 7
Justice Gulotta used this same rationale in deciding the instant
case. In Yonkers,"5 he reiterated that "good faith abolition of job
positions is not a term or condition of employment [and] any
collective bargaining agreement purporting to bind the public em-
ployer thereon cannot be upheld."69 He again presented an alterna-
tive holding. He stated that even if the court held that this non-
mandatory subject could be voluntarily negotiated upon, the finan-
cial emergency of the city and the pressing public concerns it breeds
could render an otherwise valid job security clause invalid and
unenforceable.7 0 Justice Gulotta used similar reasoning to decide
Yonkers School Crossing Guard Union v. City of Yonkers.7'
This procession of clashing cases left the position of the courts in
a state of confusion." The appellate division continued to contend
that reduction in work force was an improper subject for negotia-
tions even after the court of appeals in Susquehanna was adamant
in insisting on the propriety of a public employer voluntarily nego-
tiating about job security. Justice Gulotta also argued that even
if he accepted the non-mandatory-but-permissive stance of New
Rochelle and Susquehanna, the peculiar public policy considera-
tions involved in the cases that he was deciding would demand that
he refuse to enforce the job security clauses. While he had to con-
sider the acute financial difficulties of the cities involved in Schwab,
Yonkers, and Yonkers School Crossing, this problem did not face
the court of appeals in Susquehanna.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 51 App. Div. 2d 568, 379 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 40 N.Y.2d 268, 353 N.E.2d
569, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1976).
69. 51 App. Div. 2d at 568, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
70. Id. at 568-69, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
71. 51 App. Div. 2d 594, 379 N.Y.S.2d 113, aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 964, 354 N.E.2d 846, 387
N.Y.S.2d 105 (1976). This latter case was distinctive from the others Justice Gulotta was
considering since the collective bargaining agreement involved did not explicity exclude
budgetary reasons as an acceptable excuse for laying off employees. As a result, the court of
appeals affirmed the appellate division's holding in Yonkers School Crossing Guard Union.
72. See generally Note, 4 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 545, 557-58 (1976).
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Resolution of these conflicting opinions came when the court of
appeals reversed the appellate division's decision in Yonkers.73 The
court's task was to decide whether a stay of arbitration should be
affirmed, or whether the parties should be directed to proceed to
arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.'
The court was not required to provide remedies for breach of the job
security clause, or even to decide whether a breach did, in fact,
occur. 5 However, in order to make the decision of whether the stay
73. 40 N.Y.2d 268, 276, 353 N.E.2d 569, 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d 657, 661 (1976).
74. Id. at 271, 353 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
75. Id. at 276, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 661. A comparison should be drawn at
this point to another case Chief Judge Breitel decided on the same day. In Burke v. Bowen,
40 N.Y.2d 264, 353 N.E.2d 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1976), twenty-two active members of the
paid fire department of Long Beach brought an action to seek review of the dismissal of
thirteen other paid firefighters, and the reinstatement of their former co-workers. Id. at 266,
353 N.E.2d at 568, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 655. Plaintiffs urged that the laying off of the thirteen
firefighters constituted a breach of the job security provision in the collective bargaining
agreement negotiated between the City of Long Beach and the firefighters union. Id. The job
security provision guaranteed that thirty-four would be the minimum number of active fire-
fighters in Long Beach for the duration of the agreement (three years and seven months), and
emphasized that "in no event shall the presently agreed upon minimum be readjusted down-
ward." Id. at 266, 353 N.E.2d at 568, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 656. The stated intent of the provision
was to assure both "public safety standards as well as minimum job protection for the fire-
fighters." Id. Accordingly, the plaintiffs contended that their safety was endangered by
having to work with the reduced number of firefighters. Id. at 266, 353 N.E.2d at 568, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 655.
The court of appeals affirmed the appellate division's and the supreme court's holdings of
dismissal of the petition. Id. at 268, 353 N.E.2d at 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 656. Chief Judge
Breitel held that, although job security is a permissive subject for negotiations under the
Taylor Law, and although the job security provision involved was valid (since it was, like the
clause in Yonkers, of relatively brief duration, not negotiated in a time of financial emergency,
and explicit in forbidding layoffs for budgetary reasons), the remedy that the plaintiffs sought
and the fact that their was no arbitration clause in their agreement dictated that he dismiss
the petition. Id. at 267, 353 N.E.2d at 568-69, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
The judge explained that since there was no arbitration clause in their collective bargaining
agreement, the plaintiffs were asking that the court decide the merits of the dispute-whether
a breach occurred, and, if so, what remedy should be meted out. Chief Judge Breitel stated
that the equitable remedy of specific performance was the only remedy available to the
plaintiffs since they were not the ones fired, and thus would not have standing to ask for
damages at law for breach. Id. at 267-68, 353 N.E.2d at 569, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 656. The judge
declared that "in the throes of a grave financial crisis, the city should not, as a matter of
equity, be compelled to reinstate the dismissed firefighters." Id. at 267, 353 N.E.2d at 569,
386 N.Y.S.2d at 656. Therefore, since Chief Judge Breitel considered the remedy of specific
performance to be inappropriate under the circumstances, and since it was the only remedy
available to the plaintiffs, he dismissed the petition. Id. at 268, 353 N.E.2d at 569, 386
N.Y.S.2d at 656.
It is evident that the absence of an arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agree-
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of arbitration should be affirmed, the court first had to determine
whether the job security clause was a valid and enforceable one."0
In Yonkers, Chief Judge Breitel seems to be opting for a three-
pronged test in determining the validity and enforceability of the
job security clause. He first announced a broad general rule: that
job security is a proper subject for negotiations between a public
employer and employee organization on a voluntary basis." This
general rule is an affirmation of the court of appeals holding in
Susquehanna."5 Chief Judge Breitel maintained that a public em-
ployer can voluntarily negotiate about a non-mandatory subject of
negotiations if no prohibitive statute, controlling decisional law, or
public policy exists. He concluded that these factors were not pres-
ent so as to prevent the board of education from voluntarily negoti-
ating about job security. 0 This decision is reasonable and appears
consistent with the Legislature's intent in framing the Taylor Law,
especially since the public policy of that law would seem to encour-
age, rather than restrict, voluntary negotiation by a public em-
ployer.
Although the Taylor Law requires only that the public employer
negotiate with a certified employee association concerning the
"terms and conditions of employment,"" and does not address itself
to permissive negotiations about other subjects, nothing in the law
negates this possibility. The stated aim of the Taylor Law is to
"promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between gov-
ment in Burke was unfortunate for the public employees involved. Chief Judge Breitel's
decision suggests that if there had been an arbitration provision in the collective bargaining
agreement, he would have directed the parties to proceed to arbitration as he did in Yonkers.
Thus, it is interesting to compare the two decisions and to note that, subsequent to the court
of appeals' decision in Yonkers that directed the parties to proceed to arbitration, the arbitra-
tor did direct the Board of Education to reinstate the dismissed teachers. Yonkers Fed'n of
Teachers v. Board of Educ., No. 1339-0424-76 (1976) (House, Arb.).
76. Plaintiff Board of Education brought the proceeding for a stay of arbitration under
section 7503 of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, which authorizes the court to grant
a stay of arbitration when a valid agreement has not been made or complied with. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 7503 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976). See note 4 supra and
accompanying text.
77. 40 N.Y.2d at 271-72, 353 N.E.2d at 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
78. Id. at 273-74, 353 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 659. See note 57 supra and accompa-
nying text.
79. Id.
80. 40 N.Y.2d at 274, 353 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
81. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 203, 204(2) (McKinney 1973).
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ernment and its employees." 2 The statute maintains that this pur-
pose can best be achieved by endowing the public employee with the
rights of organization and representation," and requiring the em-
ployer to negotiate with certified employee organizations.8" There-
fore, it would appear that voluntary negotiation by the employer on
a non-mandatory subject would be welcomed as a positive step to-
ward realizing the Legislature's goal of improved relations in public
employment. 5
Further indication of the rectitude of this general rule is PERB's
pronouncement of this non-mandatory-but-permissive rule in
New Rochelle."8 In West Irondequoit Teachers Association v.
Helsby,87 the court of appeals stated that "[t]he legislature, in
article 14 of the Civil Service Law. . .created PERB, and lodged
with PERB the power to resolve disputes arising out of negotiations.
Inherent in this delegation is the power to interpret and construe the
statutory scheme. Such construction given by the agency charged
with administering the statute is to be accepted if not unreason-
able." 8 This decision suggests that the court should accept the
non-mandatory-but-permissive stance of New Rochelle if it is not
unreasonable."
The rationale in New Rochelle was reasonable. PERB's decision
that a public employer could not be compelled to negotiate about
the basic policy decision of job elimination0 is certainly not unrea-
sonable. In West Irondequoit Board of Education v. West Ironde-
82. Id. § 200.
83. Id. § 200(a).
84. Id. § 200(b).
85. This assumption is further supported by the Governor's Committee on Public Em-
ployee Relations' Final Report. In it, Professor Taylor and his associates advised that such
"harmonious relations" between public employees and their employers could not be achieved
without affording public employees rights of representation and negotiation, and that "these
rights of association and negotiation must be accorded as a necessary counterpart to the
prohibition of strikes by public employees." GOVERNOR'S COMM. ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS' FINAL REP., STATE OF NEW YORK 14 (March 31, 1966). See also Comment, 2
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 506, 521 n.78 (1974).
86. 4 P.E.R.B. 3704, 3707 (1971).
87. 35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1974).
88. 35 N.Y.2d 46, 50-51, 315 N.E.2d 775, 777, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722-23 (1974) (citations
omitted).
89. See note 27 supra.
90. 4 P.E.R.B. at 3706.
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quoit Teachers Association,9 PERB expressed its justification for
this decision by stating that "basic decisions as to public policy
should not be made in the isolation of a negotiation table, but rather
[they] should be made by those having the direct and sole responsi-
bility therefor, and whose actions in this regard are subject to review
in the electoral process."92
Furthermore, PERB's decision in New Rochelle to grant the pub-
lic employer the discretion to agree to negotiate about job elimina-
tions"3 also seems justifiable. The public employer's responsibility
to the public is to use its best judgement in making managerial
decisions.9 A governmental agency does not neglect this responsibil-
ity by voluntarily negotiating about job reductions. Whether the
employer makes this managerial decision unilaterally, or makes the
managerial decision to decide the issue by negotiating with an em-
ployee organization, is immaterial. The employer remains answera-
ble to its constituency in both cases.
Thus, this general non-mandatory-but-permissive rules ap-
pears to be a valid and accurate one. The aforementioned public
policy considerations and the recognition by the court of appeals of
the conclusiveness of a reasonable decision by PERB support this
finding. However, Chief Judge Breitel also stated: "This is not to
say . . . that all job security clauses are valid and enforceable or
that they are valid and enforceable under all circumstances.""5 He
therefore placed two qualifications on this general rule.
First, he said that not all job security clauses are valid and en-
forceable. This statement suggests that a particular job security
clause must first meet some kind of minimal requirements in order
to be considered valid and merit enforcement by the courts. The
court concluded that the job security clause in the instant case was
valid when made since it was brief in duration (three years), was not
negotiated at a time of financial emergency, and was explicit in
excluding budgetary considerations as a permissible excuse for fir-
91. 4 P.E.R.B. 3725 (1971).
92. Id. at 3727. See notes 36-39 supra and accompanying text.
93. 4 P.E.R.B. at 3707. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
94. 4 P.E.R.B. at 3706.
95. 40 N.Y.2d at 275, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
96. Id.
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ing employees. 7 Chief Judge Breitel did not specify whether the
presence of all three elements is a necessary condition for the valid-
ity of a job security clause. He merely stated that not "all job secu-
rity clauses are valid and enforceable,""8 and that the clause in the
instant case was valid because these three factors were present.
Chief Judge Breitel also posited that a job security clause might
not be "valid and enforceable under all circumstances " -a second
qualification. This pronouncement suggests that external circum-
stances can intervene to render an otherwise valid job security
clause invalid and unenforceable. In dicta, Chief Judge Breitel
maintained that, at times, public policy considerations would be
pressing enough to justify the breach of a job security clause by a
public employer. 00 He noted that if the city were on the verge of
bankruptcy, all its obligations, including job security clauses, would
suffer impairment and dissolution in an effort to save the city from
such a fate. 0'
However, the court held that the job security clause involved in
the instant case was "not yet vulnerable to attack as in violation of
public policy."''0 It did not accept the board of education's insist-
ence that the "Financial Emergency Act evince[d] a legislative
determination of public policy that job abolition must be permitted
in this case."'0 3 Rather, Chief Judge Breitel pointed out that the
New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of Yonkers
posited that attrition, not job abolition, should be the employer's
primary means of stabilizing its work force in an effort to balance
its budget. 0
This decision appears to be sound, for it seems that public policy
would warrant enforcement, and not breach of the job security
clause. As Chief Judge Breitel logically and persuasively argued: 05
the overriding purpose of the act [New York State Financial Emergency Act
for the City of Yonkers] was to protect those who had entered into agree-
97. Id. at 275-76, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660-61.
98. Id. at 275, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 276, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 275, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 275, 353 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 660 (emphasis added).
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ments with the city and to insure that these agreements would be kept, not
only bondholders and noteholders, but all others who had engaged in contrac-
tual agreements with the city . . . . A job security provision insures that, at
least for the duration of the agreement, the employee need not fear being
put out of a job. Such absence of fear may be critical to the maintenance and
efficiency of public employment, just as the fear of inability to meet its debts
may destroy the credit of the municipality. A job security clause is useless if
the public employer is free to discard it when it is first needed.
The three-pronged test that emerges from Chief Judge Breitel's
opinion appears to be a valid and effective way of determining the
validity of a job security clause and the enforceability of its provi-
sions. The public policy of New York seems to support his general
rule and encourage, rather than restrict, the voluntary negotiation
of the non-mandatory subject of job security by the public em-
ployer. The Taylor Law's policy of encouraging harmonious rela-
tions in public employment °6 would be thwarted if an employer
were allowed to mislead his employees by negotiating a completely
impotent agreement. Moreover, the judge's two qualifications pro-
vide proper and necessary safeguards against any misuse of this
broad power to negotiate about job security.
In its application of this three-pronged test, the court of appeals
correctly discredited and disproved the contentions of the appellate
division. It rejected the appellate division's assertion that job secu-
rity is an improper subject of negotiations.' 7 It also negated the
appellate division's alternate holding that a financial crisis similar
to the one that the city of Yonkers was experiencing provides enough
justification for a public employer to dishonor and ignore a negoti-
ated job security clause. 08
The Yonkers decision should be of great encouragement to public
employees in New York. It was delivered at a time when the govern-
ment of that state laid off an unprecedented number of its public
employees. It does not endow civil servants with the right to demand
negotiations on job security. However, it does affirm the public
employer's ability to negotiate voluntarily about job security, and
holds that the terms of such an agreement should be enforced. As a
106. N.Y. Civ. SeRv. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1973). See note 83 supra and accompanying
text.
107. See notes 51, 63-65, 70 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 67-68, 71 supra and accompanying text.
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result, the decision provides public employees with the assurance
that the government will have to attach as much importance and
significance to its agreements with them, as it affords to its obliga-
tions to bankers, bondholders, noteholders, financial investors and
other creditors.
Joan W Keenan

